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Abstract From 1900 onwards, scientists and novel­
ists have explored the contours of a future society 
based on the use of ‘‘anthropotechnologies’’ (tech­
niques applicable to human beings for the purpose of 
performance enhancement ranging from training and 
education to genome-based biotechnologies). Gradu­
ally but steadily, the technologies involved migrated 
from (science) fiction into scholarly publications, and 
from ‘‘utopia’’ (or ‘‘dystopia’’) into science. Building 
on seminal ideas borrowed from Nietzsche, Peter 
Sloterdijk has outlined the challenges inherent in this 
development. Since time immemorial, and at least
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since the days of Plato’s Academy, human beings 
have been interested in possibilities for (physical or 
mental) performance enhancement. We are constantly 
trying to improve ourselves, both collectively and 
individually, for better or for worse. At present, 
however, new genomics-based technologies are open­
ing up new avenues for self-amelioration. Develop­
ments in research facilities using animal models may 
to a certain extent be seen as expeditions into our own 
future. Are we able to address the bioethical and 
biopolitical issues awaiting us? After analyzing and 
assessing Sloterdijk’s views, attention will shift to a 
concrete domain of application, namely sport genom­
ics. For various reasons, top athletes are likely to play 
the role of genomics pioneers by using personalized 
genomics information to adjust diet, life-style, train­
ing schedules and doping intake to the strengths and 
weaknesses of their personalized genome information. 
Thus, sport genomics may be regarded as a test bed 
where the contours of genomics-based self-manage­
ment are tried out.
Keywords Genomics • Sport genomics • 
Personalised genomics • Anthropotechnologies • 
Science novels • Bioethics • Peter Sloterdijk
Begin at the beginning
‘‘I  shall begin at the beginning ’’, said the DHC
[Director o f Hatcheries and Conditioning], and
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the more zealous students recorded his inten­
tions in their notebooks: Begin at the beginning. 
‘‘These’’, he waved his hand, ‘‘are the incuba­
tors.’’ And in opening an insulated door he 
showed them racks upon racks o f numbered 
test-tubes. ‘‘The week’s supply o f ova. Kept’’, he 
explained, ‘‘at blood heat; whereas the male 
gametes’’, and here he opened another door, 
‘‘they have to be kept at thirty-five instead of 
thirty-seven’’. Still leaning against the incuba­
tors he gave them ... a brief description o f the 
modern fertilizing process; spoke first, o f 
course, o f its surgical introduction -  ‘‘the 
operation undergone voluntarily for the good 
o f Society, not to mention the fact that it carries 
a bonus amounting to six months’ s a la r y .’’ 
etc. (Huxley 1932/1947, p. 9).
This quotation was taken from the famous opening 
chapter of Aldous Huxley’s novel Brave New 
World (1947) in which literary tools are used for an 
exploration of the future. Huxley did not write his 
novel in a vacuum, ex nihilo, of course. On the 
contrary, it was a contribution to an already existing 
stream of literature that had begun to emerge around 
1900 and consisted of publications written predomi­
nantly by authors who were scientist, novelists, or 
both. Gradually but steadily, the ideas addressed in 
these writings migrated from novels, plays and stories 
into scientific publications. Indeed, in the course of 
the 20th century, there was a steady trek of such ideas 
from utopia (or dystopia) to science, to borrow a 
famous title from the writings of Friedrich Engels 
(1880/1976). What Engels outlined with regard to 
socialism, applies to bioscience as well: due to the 
initial immaturity of scientific developments, the 
visions involved, envisioning an ‘‘ideal’’ science- 
driven society (as alluring as they were uncanny), 
were more a matter of foresight and fiction than 
reality. They were idealistic and even naïve, and 
condemned to producing utopian (or dystopian) 
views—utopian or dystopian depending on the 
(technophilic or technophobic) denomination of the 
reader. And the more these views were fleshed out in 
detail, the more their phantasmatic nature became 
apparent. Yet, in the course of the century, this clearly 
changed. In 1978 Louise Brown, the first IVF child 
was born, an important milestone for reproductive 
biomedicine, but also an example of science fiction
becoming reality, or utopia becoming science. In 
public media, this ‘‘test-tube’’ baby was emphatically 
presented as a perfectly normal and healthy child. Yet 
a technique that was initially directed towards repro­
ducing normalcy, could in principle provide a window 
for modification and enhancement as well.
Finally, the century that began with Mendel and Loeb 
resulted in a famous Press Conference (June 26 2000) 
where President Bill Clinton, together with Francis 
Collins and Craig Venter, formally announced that the 
human genome sequencing effort was nearing its 
completion, opening-up a plethora of potential uses of 
human genomics information in various fields. The 
press conference amounted to something of a science 
show, the penultimate movement in a technoscientific 
strip-tease, for in reality nature still strived to conceal 
herself even then, as Herakleitos had already stated: the 
Consortium had to continue its sequencing efforts for 
another 4 years to come before the Human Genome 
Project could really be considered ‘‘completed’’.
The question I intend to address in this article is 
how we are to assess the bioethical and biopolitical 
challenges these developments entail for health 
management by individuals and society, for personal 
as well as for public health. There is a widespread 
conviction that, as scientific research is moving into 
new terrain, philosophical and bioethical discourses 
are challenged to adapt themselves to the novel 
circumstances thus emerging. Massive, technology- 
driven research efforts, directed at producing stag­
gering amounts of bioinformation, are bound to raise 
new issues that reanimate the philosophical and 
bioethical paradigms of the recent past. But what do 
these challenges amount to and what would be 
needed in order to address them in adequate ways?
The article will start with a short historical 
retrospect concerning the maturation of utopian ideas 
into scientific research practices as outlined above, 
focussing on literary writings by Wells, Huxley and 
(finally) Houellebecq. Building on this concise his­
torical review of fiction and forecast, I will then 
address the question what kind of future is awaiting 
us, what kind of utopia (or dystopia) is implied in 
contemporary genomics science as it is currently 
emerging, and what this entails for the conceptual 
frameworks and methods of biophilosophers and 
bioethicists. In order to address this question, I will 
first of all reflect on recent writings of the German 
philosopher Peter Sloterdijk and, to a lesser extent, on
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those of Michel Foucault. Notably in his provocative 
lecture ‘‘Rules for the human park’’ (1999/2001), 
Sloterdijk deliberates precisely on this type of issue 
by announcing the emergence of what he refers to as 
a new wave of ‘‘anthropotechnologies’’, technologies 
that pervade our ‘‘essence’’ (notably our genome and 
our brain) and the question will be how we are to 
assess them in terms of ‘‘biopower’’ and ‘‘practices of 
the Self’’. Subsequently, in order to move from a 
panoramic and philosophical to a more concrete and 
bioethical level, I will focus on two particular fields 
of application where the implications of genomics for 
biomanagement are now beginning to present them­
selves and that therefore constitute important stage 
settings for exploring the future uses of genomics and 
bioinformation, namely the professional sports 
domain and the animal husbandry domain.
The Beginning: The Year 1900
The year 1900 has been regarded as a quantum leap 
in the history of science, a kind of Cambrian 
Explosion of novel ideas. In the realm of the 
humanities, Freud launched the psychoanalytical 
movement with his Interpretation o f Dreams and 
Husserl launched the phenomenological movement 
with his Logical Investigations. The sense of rupture 
was even more acute in the scientific realm, with the 
introduction of the quantum concept by Planck 
(thereby launching quantum physics), the introduc­
tion of the mutation concept by De Vries, the 
discovery of blood types by Landsteiner and (of 
course) the rediscovery of the work of Mendel. All of 
a sudden, the basic conviction proliferated among 
scientists working in various fields (like an intellec­
tual epidemic) that nature does make leaps (natura 
facit saltus) and that characteristics of entities depend 
on the presence or absence of discrete elements, be it 
elementary particles, antigens or genes. This convic­
tion was at odds with the idea, dominant throughout 
the 19th Century, that nature progresses through 
accumulations of infinitesimal changes. Darwin for 
example was so thoroughly convinced of this that he 
explicitly stated on no less than seven occasions in 
The origin o f species that nature does not make leaps 
(natura non facit saltus).
In that same period, around the year 1900, biologist 
Jacques Loeb (1899/1905) put forward the idea that
biology should give way to biotechnology. Organisms 
can be manipulated by adding certain chemical 
substances to their environments. He discovered for 
instance that, by manipulating their external milieu, 
‘‘artificial parthenogenesis’’ (non-sexual reproduc­
tion) could be induced in sea urchins and he concluded 
that, in principle, artificial reproduction in ‘‘mam­
mals’’ (that is: humans) would be possible as well. In 
the textbook The science o f life (1931/1938), written 
by H.G. Wells (the science fiction writer who also was 
a prominent biologist) in collaboration with his son 
and with Julian Huxley (brother of Aldous), Loeb’s 
ideas were discussed in an anticipatory manner: ‘‘In 
mammals (again: this should be read as humans) the 
ovum is inaccessible to the experimenter, so that we 
do not know whether artificial parthenogenesis is 
possible. There is no reason to suppose that it is 
not...’’ (1931/1938, p. 509). From here, Loeb’s 
seminal biotechnological ideas made their way to 
the first chapter of Aldous Huxley’s novel, which 
contains clear references to Loeb’s experimental 
work. Basically, Loeb claimed that nature (including 
the human body) should be regarded as raw material 
for future biotechnologists to work with. Biologists 
should become bio-engineers, focussed on improving 
rather than on understanding nature (Pauly 1987).
Huxley’s novel basically seems to suggest that at a 
certain point, reproduction (biologically speaking our 
most important ‘‘assignment’’ in life) cannot be left 
to individuals (or rather, to couples). Sooner or later, 
the modern nation-state has to assume its responsi­
bility, has to begin to govern this process in a more 
rationalistic, scientific, post-fatalistic and evidence- 
based manner, in order to assure the physical and 
mental well-being and quality of life of the general 
population and of future generations through top- 
down family planning. Thus, Huxley’s novel is a 
literary exploration of what Foucault (1976) and his 
followers have analysed in terms of biopolitics and 
biopower. In Huxley’s novel, the state is seen as an 
immense biological plant, a giant hatchery for 
producing high-quality human beings, a modern, 
scientific version of Plato’s science-based ‘‘ideal’’ 
state. Therefore, his novel is a modern counterpart of 
Plato’s Republic, where the same proposition is put 
forward. In order to significantly enhance the 
performance of the city-state, the guardians will 
have to seize control over reproduction, training and 
education.
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The foresight genre, of which Brave New World 
constituted one of the highlights, was not an exclu­
sively Western phenomenon. A similar discourse 
emerged simultaneously in the Soviet Union. Here, as 
in the West, utopian/dystopian ideas were vigorously 
explored in stories and essays concerning the artificial 
production of a new type of human beings, happy and 
productive, adapted to technology-driven social envi­
ronments. And here as well, the replacement of 
natural (sexual) reproduction by artificial reproduc­
tion and parthenogenesis in the context of hatchery­
like facilities constituted a crucial ingredient (Groys 
and Hagemeister 2005).
As far as Western sources are concerned, there is a 
clear ‘‘genealogical’’ connection, via Loeb, from 
Wells to Huxley. Besides authoring science fiction 
novels, H.G. Wells also published biological treatises 
and essays. In 1902, he published an article in Nature 
entitled The discovery o f the future in which ‘‘two 
types of mind’’ were distinguished. The first and 
dominant type, he argued, is retrospective in habit and 
committed to learning from the past. The second type, 
however, is oriented towards the future. Whereas the 
former (‘‘legal’’) type is ‘‘submissive’’, believing that 
what has been acknowledged in the past should also 
guide us through the present, the second (‘‘scientific’’) 
type is creative and masterful and oriented towards 
change. This type of mind sees contemporary society 
as a workshop, and the present as no more than 
material for the future. Given the fact that science and 
technology have come to play such an important role 
in contemporary society, Wells argued, much more 
can be learned from exploring the future (through 
anticipations and extrapolations) than from exploring 
the past. Yet, it is still the past that dominates our lives 
and thoughts. Whereas sophisticated methods have 
been developed for carefully analyzing past events 
(history, archaeology, palaeontology, etc.), the explo­
ration of the future has so far been left to novelists. 
Due to science, we have been able to produce a fairly 
clear picture of what life must have been like in the 
Roman era, or even in swamps and jungle forests of 
the Mesozoic age, for instance, but for some reason 
we keep underestimating our possibilities for produc­
ing visions of the future with a similar degree of 
accuracy. Knowledge of the future is attainable, 
however, Wells argues—and well worth attaining.
The century that began with Planck’s quantum 
concept, Mendel’s rediscovered paper, Loeb’s
experiments and Wells’ summons to produce more 
foresight research, ended more or less with Michel 
Houellebecq’s novel Elementary particles (1998). In 
this novel, literary extrapolations of our genomics 
future are combined with critical reflections on 
previous utopian projects and revolutions, as well as 
on Huxley’s dystopian novel. In Houellebecq’s book, 
the 20th century, notably the 1960s and 1970s, are 
presented as a series of revolutions or mass exper­
iments. In critical and cynical terms the author 
reflects on the philosophical, political, sexual, cul­
tural, technical and psycho-pharmaceutical experi­
ments of past decades. All these revolutions, the 
author argues, resulted in fiasco’s. Take for instance 
the philosophical revolution as it notably emerged in 
contemporary French philosophy. As Houellebecq 
points out, it ended with Deleuze committing suicide, 
Lacan becoming senile and Foucault falling victim to 
the consequences of his sexual experiments. Along 
similar lines, the other revolutions are ‘‘discussed’’ 
and discarded. The sexual revolution, he argues, 
resulted in pointless, meaningless sex, acted out not 
only in novels and movies but also in real life, the 
life-world of individuals, disconnected from procre­
ation, and wholly devoid of love and attachment. The 
psycho-pharmaceutical revolution resulted in self­
destructive and irresponsible behaviour, fake experi­
ences and malaise—and so on, and so on. Now, 
however, a new revolution has announced itself, that 
will finally succeed in delivering what the other failed 
to deliver, namely human happiness—although this 
apparently optimistic message should no doubt be 
interpreted in an ironic vein as well.
The main character of the novel, a scientist, 
managed to produce the algorithm that will allow us 
to reconstruct and optimize our genome, the essence 
of what we are. Thus, a new type of human beings can 
finally be produced, in order to replace the existing 
(unhappy) type. More or less at the same moment, in 
1999, the German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk pub­
lished his essay Regeln fur den Menschenpark 
[‘‘Rules for the human park’’], that later became 
embedded as a chapter in an important volume on 
Heidegger (Sloterdijk 1999/2001), in which similar 
ideas are fleshed out. In his lecture, Sloterdijk presents 
a provocative view on the history and possible future 
of humankind. Human beings, he argues, are to a 
considerable extent self-made. Building on seminal 
Nietzschean ideas, he presents human history as a
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narrative of self-domestication and self-amelioration. 
Until recently, Sloterdijk argues, humanistic strategies 
have been tremendously important in this respect, 
notably through the emergence of literacy: the ability 
to read, write and exchange letters and books, thus 
enhancing the pace of communication, life and 
history, while opening up avenues for communication 
and “epistolary friendship” even between individuals 
belonging to different historical periods. Reading and 
writing are seen by Sloterdijk as techniques or 
practices of the Self, to use the Foucauldian term, as 
“anthropotechnologies” , allowing us to create new 
cultural environments and to adapt ourselves to our 
self-made socio-cultural world through education. 
Through practices such as literacy, we became what 
we essentially are, or believe ourselves to be, namely 
autonomous, rational and responsible individuals.
However, in the near future, Sloterdijk argues, 
these humanistic strategies may no longer suffice to 
intensify the process of self-edification. At a certain 
point, biotechnologies may be put to use as ‘‘anthro­
potechnologies’’ in order to open-up new possibilities 
in this direction—as was also suggested in Houelle­
becq’s novel. But what exactly does Sloterdijk mean 
by that? In the next section, I want to analyse his 
ideas, that caused something of a scandal at their time 
of publication, in more detail.
Anthropogenesis: The Coming into Being 
of Human Beings
In order to explore the contours of a future ‘‘human 
park’’, Sloterdijk’s lecture begins at the beginning, 
with an updated philosophical vision of our early pre­
historic past. Building on ideas articulated by Nietz­
sche he argues that, unlike other domesticated 
animals, human beings more or less domesticated 
themselves, thus occupying both the subject and the 
object pole of the domestication process—we have 
been both our shepherd and our herd. According to 
Sloterdijk, philosophers until now have consistently 
failed to acknowledge and consider the pivotal role of 
self-domestication in the process of anthropogenesis 
(the coming into being of humankind).
Notably the Neolithic revolution (the introduction 
of agriculture) was crucially important. Since then, 
we became sedentary beings who created an artificial 
ecosystem, a socio-cultural sphere of our own, a kind
of incubator or hatching facility where animals were 
domesticated, plants were cultivated, individuals 
were educated and stories were exchanged—trans- 
mitted from one generation to the next. Our philo­
sophical blind spot, according to Sloterdijk, has 
always been the extent to which our own early history 
is intimately connected with the history of (other) 
species we actively domesticated. Our view of history 
has always been ‘‘humanistic’’ and therefore biased in 
the sense of being overtly anthropocentric.
This view, articulated by Sloterdijk in 1999, shortly 
before the theatrical unveiling of the human genome 
sequence, is confirmed by contemporary genomics 
research as it has evolved since then. Until recently, 
human history was basically seen as a single-species 
narrative. Genomics, however, allows us to recon­
struct our history in ecocentric terms, as a history of 
artificial ecosystems, where humans and other species 
(domesticated animals, cultivated plants, microbes 
involved in fermentation and the like) cohabitate and 
co-evolve. The genomes of the rice plant, or the 
potato, or the domesticated cow constitute bioarchives 
in which we find our own history reflected. While 
dramatically changing our domesticated animals and 
cultivated plants, we have simultaneously changed 
ourselves, by transforming our environment and 
thereby altering the course of our socio-cultural 
trajectories. We have drastically changed the condi­
tions of our own evolution, our own history. Humanity 
as we now know it, is the outcome, the ‘‘product’’ of a 
development that can be reconstructed in a much more 
detailed manner than ever before due to the bioar­
chives made available by sequencing the genomes of 
the species involved.
From this perspective it becomes clear that bio­
technology, in a broad sense of the term, covering any 
technological application using living organisms, has 
played a pivotal role in human history during the past 
ten millennia or so. Biotechnology in a more contem­
porary and narrow sense, however, namely in the form 
of technologies that allow us to transform and modify 
the genomes of species more directly, through genetic 
engineering and similar techniques, is likely to play a 
no less pivotal role in determining our future. Besides 
allowing us to reconstruct important chapters of early 
human history in a much more detailed manner than 
ever before, genomics and genome-related biotech­
nologies may also provide us with new opportunities 
for continuing this history in new directions, through
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the use of a new generation of “anthropotechnologies” 
that may redefine what we are and what we may 
become. This development is bound to pose unprec­
edented challenges to philosophy, completely reset­
ting biopolitical and bioethical agendas. According to 
Sloterdijk, the question is whether philosophy (still 
dominated by the humanistic convictions of the past) 
is ready for these challenges. Yet, in order to assess the 
present and explore the future, we must begin at the 
beginning. How did we become the type of human 
beings we currently are in the first place?
The process of anthropogenesis, Sloterdijk argues, 
is intimately connected with processes of domestica­
tion and self-domestication. The house (domus in 
Latin) must be regarded as a ‘‘biopolitical complex’’ 
(p. 322) that set the stage for the process of anthropo­
genesis to take place. Besides taming ‘‘other’’ animals, 
we also managed to tame ourselves, the animal 
‘‘within’’. This involved training, but also other 
domestication techniques such as selection (through 
uneven prospects for reproduction). This ‘‘bottom-up’’ 
and time-consuming process—bottom-up in the sense 
that in took place in houses and villages rather than 
through political institutions—resulted in a particular 
type of human being. In ‘‘humanistic’’ accounts of how 
we came to be what we are, this virtually unexplored 
pre-history of self-domestication is often ‘‘repressed’’, 
ignored or eclipsed.
Another important chapter in the history of 
anthropogenesis was the emergence of literacy. Slot- 
erdijk describes how in the context of the Roman 
Empire the art of writing opened-up practices of the 
Self that allowed individuals to distance themselves 
from the ‘‘mass media’’ of the day, notably amphi­
theatres, where spectators were entertained with 
spectacular and atrocious shows. The reading and 
writing of letters and books allowed ‘‘friends of the 
alphabet’’ to develop a much more humane, less 
boisterous counter-culture. And this literacy-based 
counter-culture of epistolary networks for exchange 
between like-minded friends involved Stoics like 
Seneca as it did Christians like Saint Paul.
According to Sloterdijk, it is obvious that literacy 
presupposes self-domestication. Only people who 
inhabit a house (be it a roman villa, a monastery or 
a bourgeois mansion) are able to (learn to) write and 
read. All the typical attributes of literacy, of reading 
and writing (a chair, a table, a library, etc.), as well as 
related activities (such as walking or having a
conversation in a garden) presuppose the existence 
of a house that may contain letters and books. Even a 
church is basically a house built for the purpose of 
reading (one particular) book. And the same goes, of 
course, for schools. A school is a house that is 
basically constructed for the purpose of learning to 
read (and perhaps also to write) books—similar to the 
way in which universities are premises where indi­
viduals learn to read and write scholarly papers. Until 
recently, moreover, schools were erected for the 
purpose of learning to read particular types of book, 
notably books that were part of the national cultural 
canon, written in a more or less artificial national 
language that tended to differ from the various verbal 
dialects spoken at home or in the local village. Thus, 
literacy not only involved the introduction of new 
tools for self-enhancement (the acquisition of new 
communicative skills), but also a replacement and re­
contextualisation of the process of ‘‘producing’’ and 
shaping human beings, from homes and hamlets to 
novel types of buildings, directed towards discipline 
and control. This also resulted in new forms of 
selection. The individuals (pupils) involved in these 
school-type practices could well be regarded as 
objects and targets, rather than as subjects of the 
process.
According to Sloterdijk, however, we are now 
entering an era in which new possibilities for selection 
and self-enhancement present themselves, for 
instance in the form of pre-natal selection, in the 
context of IVF. Increasingly, and contrary to what was 
suggested in Huxley’s novel Brave New World, this 
process is individual-driven, rather than state-driven, 
and will allow individuals to occupy the ‘‘subject’’ 
rather than the object pole of the process. They 
themselves are the ones that will be increasingly 
exposed to a proliferation of technology-based oppor­
tunities for reproductive choice. This is not by 
definition a pleasant situation, far from it. According 
to Sloterdijk, contemporary human beings clearly 
display a profound uneasiness towards these new 
possibilities for exerting biopower, and rightly so, for 
these possibilities seem much more powerful and 
consequential than the ones we have been able to 
sufficiently familiarised ourselves with in the past (p. 
328). Yet, according to Sloterdijk, instead of deciding 
to refuse to use these new possibilities for biopower at 
all—which may well be our first impulse, but also a 
dead alley and a form of escapism -, we rather should
Ô  Springer
From Utopia to Science
face the challenge of formulating a new codex for the 
use of emerging anthropotechnologies (p. 329). 
Whether and to what extent these new anthropotech­
nologies will bring about a dramatic change of human 
phenotypes and genotypes, through a conscious shift 
from reproduction ‘‘fatalism’’ to genomics-based 
selection, may still be an open question as yet, but 
should nonetheless become a major issue of concern. 
As Kant already indicated, it is typical for human 
beings to be confronted with question they seem 
neither able to resolve nor to ignore, and the issues 
raised by newly emerging anthropologies clearly 
seem to fall under this heading.
At the same time, Sloterdijk reminds his readers of 
the fact that such issues are not completely without 
precedent. In a number of dialogues, notably Politi- 
kes, Plato already deliberates on issues involved in 
the management and amelioration of humankind. In 
Plato’s view, the ancient polis emerges as a kind of 
human park, where enlightened aristocrats see it as 
their responsibility to govern human reproduction in a 
rational manner for the benefit of the state. Thus, the 
polis emerges as a kind of hatchery where human 
beings are produced—an ancient precursor of Hux­
ley’s Brave New World. According to Sloterdijk, the 
question is not whether we will decide to use 
emerging anthropotechnologies such as prenatal 
selection or gene therapy in the future—there can 
be no doubt that we will—but rather how we are to 
organize their use in such a way that human 
individuals may become the ‘‘subjects’’ rather than 
the ‘‘objects’’ of the process, the authors rather than 
the targets of these emerging bioexperiments.
A similar perspective has been voiced by Michel 
Foucault in 1976, when the notion of biopower was 
introduced by him, and once again in 1984 with the 
introduction of the notion of the ‘‘care for the Self’’. 
In 1976, he explored how, in the 19th century, nation 
states began to take an interest in (or rather, to 
develop serious concerns regarding) the physical 
well-being of their populations, notably of the lower 
social strata. These concerns were driven by the 
consideration that the physical well-being of the 
masses (in terms of health care, food, housing, 
hygiene, etc.) constituted a major factor of economic 
and military importance. Various biopolicies were 
designed for the purpose of monitoring and improv­
ing the physical condition of large numbers of people. 
Thus emerged the concept of public health. From this
perspective, individuals were the objects or targets, 
rather the authors or initiators, of biopolitics. In 1984, 
however, a different perspective was opened-up. 
Now, Foucault became interested in the practices 
individuals themselves may engage in to shape and 
manage their own life and care for their own body 
and health. Like Sloterijk, Foucault indicates that this 
should not be seen in terms of an Either/Or: to 
domesticate or to be domesticated. This was rather 
the way in which the issue was framed by Plato, 
building on a dichotomy, a basic distinction between 
two types of human beings, namely aristocrats and 
slaves, those who can and those who cannot reason­
ably be granted the responsibility to care for them­
selves as well as for others. According to Plato, this 
dichotomy represented a ‘‘natural’’ distinction, 
almost amounting to a demarcation between two 
different subspecies. In the view of authors such as 
Nietzsche, Foucault and Sloterdijk, however, things 
are much more complicated. Domestication of others 
and of ourselves are processes that are complemen­
tary and closely connected. In various situations 
individuals may occupy various positions. Both 
biopolitics and care for the Self, both domestication 
and Self-domestication constitute pivotal dimensions 
or axes of the pastoral complex. We cannot ‘‘decide’’ 
whether to domesticate or be domesticated, to be 
disciplined or to manage our own life, as we are 
always involved in both processes. Rather, the 
question is how to assume the subject-position as 
consciously as possible. In the face of newly emerg­
ing biotechnologies, how can we really position 
ourselves in such as way that we will be able to 
influence and govern our own future, both as 
individuals and as societies? According to Sloterdijk, 
the humanistic response, a discourse that basically 
rejects the newly emerging anthropotechnologies as 
being at odds with and as constituting a threat to 
human ‘‘dignity’’, can no longer be expected to 
provide us with viable answers. The ‘‘post-human’’ 
response rather argues that our ‘‘dignity’’ resides in 
the fact that we can be, and often have been, in a 
position that allows us to form and reform ourselves, 
with the help of a broad range of techniques, from 
reading and writing letters and diaries up to prenatal 
diagnostics. Our ‘‘essence’’ resides in our ability to 
shape, manage and transform ourselves. We have 
never been satisfied with ourselves, we have always 
kept working on ourselves, always interested in
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developing new tools for self-amelioration, and there 
is no reason to suppose that we will stop doing so in 
the future.
Anthropotechnologies: Ancient and Emerging
Ten years after the publication of his human park 
essay, Sloterdijk (2009) published an important sequel 
in which the history of anthropotechnologies is 
fleshed out from an individual (or ethical) rather than 
from a political perspective. The history of human­
kind is seen as a history of emerging practices of self­
improvement. Since time immemorial, human beings 
have been pushing performance boundaries through 
spiritual, mental and physical exercises. An important 
chapter in this history is the Renaissance of the 
professional athlete and the resurge of the ancient 
stadium (the modern arena) around 1900. The inau­
guration of the first Olympic Games (Athens 1896, 
Paris 1900, etc.) exemplified the breakthrough of the 
neo-Olympic movement, the neo-athletic syndrome. 
Since then, top sport has emerged as a practice of 
continuous self-improvement and enhancement 
through anthropotechnologies (training schedules, 
diets, special techniques, dexterity of movement, 
respiratory regimes, high-altitude training, etc.). 
Again, Sloterdijk develops his diagnosis of the present 
through a series of flash-backs to important begin­
nings. And once again, a major point of departure, 
also for the history of anthropotechnologies, is Plato’s 
Academy, a training site devoted to athletics and 
philosophy, to physical and mental gymnastics, as 
well as to trainer-athlete interaction.
Building on Sloterdijk’s diagnosis I would argue 
that the basic objective of Plato’s anthropotechnolo­
gies or practices of the Self is already fleshed out in 
his famous simile of the cave, a staging that in many 
respects seems to have served as model or archetype 
for Huxley’s opening passage cited above:
Picture men dwelling in a sort of subterranean 
cavern... Conceive them as having their legs 
and necks fettered from childhood, so that they 
remain in the same sport, able to look forward 
only, and prevented by the fetters from turning 
their h e a d s . etc. (Plato 1935/2000, 514).
At a certain point, some of these hyper-domesticated 
human beings are freed from their chains. They are
literally ‘‘educated’’, that is: they begin to move 
upwards, towards the light. This, however, is a painful 
and time-consuming process, involving training and 
exercise, for instance training of the sense organs. 
Moreover, once the individuals involved are suffi­
ciently enlightened, they will find it impossible to 
return to their former positions. Plato’s uncanny and at 
first instance rather bizarre scene reads like a Paleo­
lithic hatching facility for producing human beings, a 
Flintstone-like version of Huxley’s biotechnological 
assembly line. These prisoners may also be seen as 
human cattle, subject to practices of human “hus­
bandry” . Their very position is similar to that of 
domesticated animals in contemporary bio-industry. 
As such, the simile seems to indicate that, as a purely 
biological entity, human beings are still far from 
finished, far from human. Therefore, they are to be 
subjected to anthropotechnologies in the form of 
training schedules and educational modules. Only a 
select number of them will become intellectual top 
athletes bound to greatly surpass untrained (fettered) 
human beings in terms of physical or intellectual 
performance. In Plato’s days, this miracle of self­
improvement and self-enhancement was performed 
through training (paideia) alone. Perhaps that now, 
new types of anthropotechnologies may allow us to 
push our physical and mental boundaries even further?
Bioinformation and Enhancement
Philosophers, novelists and other masters of the 
imagination have used their art to explore their way 
into our present and future. Genomics, notably the 
sequencing of the human genome, initially on a general 
(‘‘species’’) level, and now increasingly in an individ­
ual level as well (allowing future citizens to consider 
the strengths and weaknesses of their own genetic 
constitution through personalised genomics informa­
tion), in combination with proliferating biotechnolo­
gies, allow us in principle to use this information in 
order to (continue to) enhance ourselves. The question 
how we are to use this new type of biopower can no 
longer be ignored. Are we about to make another 
significant leap in the history of self-formation?
It seems predictable that genomics-based bioin­
formation will increasingly affect the ways in which 
we (as individuals and as societies) will manage our 
individual and public health. Initially, the focus will
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be on the use of bioinformation as information, 
notably for purposes of prevention, through adapting 
our life-style (food, environment, therapy, career 
choice, etc.) to the information provided by sequenc­
ing genomes. This will also involve various forms of 
training: we will have to learn to interpret this type of 
data into meaningful options and choices. The next 
step, somewhat more futuristic perhaps, but nonethe­
less already explored in various contexts such as 
animal laboratories not wholly unlike Plato’s cave in 
terms of spatial organisation, will consist of devel­
oping technologies that will allow us to actively 
influence our organism, our genome, on the basis of 
genomics information. For instance, modified viral 
genomes may be introduced in human bodies in order 
to produce certain tissues or certain neurotransmitters 
in a tailored and targeted manner to counteract the 
effects of ageing or degenerative disorders. Those 
who distance themselves from such scenarios under 
the pretence that they seem fictitious and unrealistic, 
are apparently ignorant of the extent to which such 
research trajectories are already designed and con­
ducted in laboratories worldwide exactly for this 
purpose, using animal models. Bioethics and biopol­
itics cannot afford to put themselves consciously 
behind schedule by closing their eyes for these 
developments. Rather, we should train ourselves in a 
new style of ethical thinking, designed in close 
proximity and interaction with experts involved in 
these technoscientific developments, in order to 
address the opportunities and dilemma’s they entail.
In contrast to what Huxley suggested in his novel,
I do not find it all that plausible that future 
generations will begin their life in a test-tube as 
mass-produced individuals in a centralised hatching 
facility. What is much more likely, however, and no 
more than an extrapolation of already existing and 
established research practices, is that somewhere in 
the near future, say 2020 or so, at the beginning of 
their life, individuals will be taken by their parents to 
a genomics facility where, in the form of a heel-prick 
test, their personal genome will be sequenced. The 
sequence thus acquired can be used for public health 
research, but will also be available and downloadable 
for the individuals involved, stored in the form of 
giant databases, or by their physicians at their 
request, for whatever purpose (dietary reasons, health 
problems, career choice, buying a house, reproduc­
tive choices, and so on). There will be avant-gardes
of course, pioneer groups such as patient suffering 
from life-threatening diseases, risk groups, special 
professions or top athletes, who will resort to such 
practices somewhat earlier than others. Top athletes 
for instance will be interested in adapting their 
training schedules and food intake, or even their use 
of doping products, to the idiosyncracies of their 
personal genome. For various reasons, the use of 
genomics bioinformation by athletes constitutes a 
kind of experimental setting, a laboratory that 
provides a preview of practices that are bound to 
spread (as a kind of technological epidemic) to other 
contexts as well, at a somewhat later stage. Therefore, 
sport genomics offers a fascinating case study for 
exploring the imminent future of public health. In the 
two final sections I intend to further explore these 
issues with the help of top athletics as a special file 
that builds on two ‘‘beginnings’’ already outlined 
above, namely Plato’s simile of the cave (symbolis­
ing what has been called the emergence of human 
thinking and of classical intellectual and athletic 
ideals around 500 B.C.) and the emergence of neo­
athleticism around 1900.
Top Athletes as Pioneers of the Genomics Era
The combination of genomics with high level sport 
activities has already aroused much attention and 
debate. One of the scenarios is that in the near future 
‘‘normal’’ sport professionals will increasingly have 
to compete with ‘‘genetically modified super-ath­
letes’’ and that the Olympics of the future will 
increasingly be dominated by the latter (Miah 2004). 
A second scenario emphasises the role of ‘‘gene 
doping’’, i.e. the non-therapeutic use of cells, genes, 
genetic elements, or the modulation of gene expres­
sion, having the capacity to improve athletic perfor­
mance (idem). A third scenario rather focuses on the 
use of genomics information in the context of 
training. In this scenario, the future Olympics will 
be dominated by genetically ‘‘normal’’ (that is, 
unmodified) athletes working in close collaboration 
with (teams of) experts and trainers who know how to 
make use of new types of genomics information in 
the context of diets, training programs and nutritional 
supplements ( ‘nutriceuticals’). Thus, existing anthro­
potechnologies will not become outdated and 
replaced, but rather amplified and complemented by
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genomics information. And of course, a combination 
of scenario’s is also possible, where ‘‘gene doping’’ 
regimes are tailored to individualised genomics 
information and vice versa.
So far, a substantial part of the discussion on 
genomics and top sport has either focussed on genetic 
manipulation and gene doping, or on the use of 
genomics information in the context of prevention 
(Jordan 1998). In the first case, the debate addresses 
issues involved in the production of ‘‘super’’ athletes 
through conscious manipulation of human genomes 
and human bodies. Technologically speaking, possi­
bilities in this direction will remain quite limited for 
the years to come, so that there is a substantial element 
of science fiction and utopia (or dystopia) in these 
debates: they constitute reflections on thought exper­
iments rather than on on-going developments. As 
Sloterdijk (2009) phrases it, genetic manipulation may 
remain a mere anecdote in the annals of athleticism. 
Nonetheless, research with animals shows that 
genomes can be transformed dramatically and that 
physical characteristics of mammals (such as bodily 
weight and muscular strength) are certainly open to 
manipulation. The question remains, however, to what 
extent these laboratory findings can and will be 
extrapolated to human subjects, given both the 
biological and the ethical restrictions in this area. So 
far at least, transgenic animals did not, as the statues 
of ancient Greek sculpture once did, arouse potential 
athletes to mimic and follow their examples.
When it comes to prevention strategies, genomics 
information, notably the presence of particular genes 
associated with increased risk for health problems 
such as heart disease or Alzheimer, could be used to 
preclude carriers of ‘‘risk genes’’ from entering 
particular sports, notably on a high performance 
professional level, such as professional soccer or 
boxing. Although these debates are interesting in 
themselves, a perhaps even more relevant impact of 
genomics on elite sport (proliferating from there to 
other practices) will evolve in a somewhat different 
direction in the sense that genomics information will 
be increasingly used to improve training and food 
regimes by tailoring parameters such as diet and 
climate (optimal training latitude and altitude) to 
personalised genomics information.
Increasingly it will become possible for genomics 
information to become ‘‘personalised’’. Although it 
may take some years to complete an affordable
personal whole-genome sequence (the famous $1.000 
genome), SNP-arrays allowing the detection of 
relevant polymorphisms and variation throughout 
the whole genome are becoming increasingly afford­
able for individuals, and this will notably apply to top 
athletes. The top athlete and his or her trainer 
constitute a team that is on the look-out for novel 
forms of information. Continuous innovation in terms 
of technique, training programmes and dexterity 
improvement makes and accounts for the (often 
slight) differences. There is no doubt that the further 
development of this scenario has the potential of 
revolutionizing professional sport as we now know it. 
By providing top athletes and their trainers and 
physicians with individualised genomics information, 
it will become increasingly possible for them to adapt 
life-style, nutritional diet and training programmes, 
but also doping intake, to the strengths and weak­
nesses indicated by the personalized genomics pro­
file. Interventions may become more targeted and 
tailor made. Gradually the focus will shift moreover 
from damage repair to prevention of harm and, on the 
conceptual level, from focussing on the presence or 
absence of single genes associated with particular 
characteristics (a monogenetic approach), to whole- 
genome association studies (a genuinely genomics 
approach). Rather than promoting one ideal diet or 
training method for all athletes, highly individualised 
schedules will be developed on the basis of persona­
lised genomics information.
Top Athletes as ‘‘Laboratory Animals’’ 
or ‘‘Athlete Husbandry’’
The basic morale of Plato’s simile of the cave can be 
formulated as follows: due to training and education as 
anthropotechnologies, human beings find themselves 
midway on a journey between two poles, namely on the 
one hand the pole of the self-domesticated, self­
subjugated animal leading a slave-like existence, and 
on the other hand the pole of the top athlete (be it in an 
intellectual, physical or artistic sense) leading a life of 
asceticism, exercise and top level performance. This 
may also be reframed in a somewhat different manner: 
we human beings constitute the mean between two 
extremes, or rather two types of animals that mirror or 
exemplify the two human poles outlined above, 
namely the domesticated animal on the one hand and
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the laboratory animal on the other. The latter is a kind 
of outpost into our own future, a highly transparent 
body whose physiological and genomic make-up is 
documented and controlled in an extremely detailed 
and precise way. Ter Gast (2007) has indicated how 
laboratory mice, inhabiting the research facilities of 
the present in astounding numbers, leading their cave­
like existence in high-tech environments, may actually 
be regarded as ‘‘biotech pioneers’’ exploring and 
already entering our own human future. Not only 
because they are inflicted with the disorders from 
which we ourselves are bound to suffer somewhere in 
the future, and subsequently subjected to the treat­
ments that we ourselves will be subjected to once those 
treatments are regarded as safe enough (and we 
ourselves are regarded as ill enough) to do so. An 
animal laboratory is like a theatre where possible 
personal futures are acted out. Not only in terms of 
therapy and disease, but also in terms of enhancement. 
To put it bluntly: what works in mice, may sooner or 
later be offered to humans. Whoever visits an animal 
research facility may well cite what the American 
journalist Joseph Lincoln Steffens phrased after his 
visit to the Soviet Union in the heydays of technosci- 
entific utopia referred to above: ‘‘I have seen the future 
and it works’’ (Kaplan 1974). What we are currently 
doing to mice in terms of size, muscular strength and 
longevity may well mirror some of the practices that 
will emerge in human health policies of the future. Not 
in the sense that we ourselves will come to inhabit 
assembly line, Brave New World facilities, but in the 
sense that particular elements of these research trajec­
tories may well become embedded in biomedical 
therapy, prevention and enhancement trajectories of 
the future. We cannot discard such a development 
simply by saying that it would be at odds with human 
dignity, as this would ignore the usual migration routes 
of knowledge claims and their biomedical applications 
from animal laboratories into hospitals and training 
sites or top sport facilities for humans.
But when it comes to exploring our own future, we 
may as well start from the other side of the spectrum, 
namely animal husbandry genomics or livestock 
genomics.1 Here, genomic sequencing information 
is used to tailor food and housing regimes to the 
genomes of the livestock involved in order to achieve
1 http://lgu.umd.edu/lgu_v2/homepages/home.cfm?trackID= 
2715
an optimal fit between genome and environment as 
well as for identification, monitoring and surveillance 
of farm animals or herds. Animal corporeality is 
“translated” into bioinformation (Harvey 2007). This 
information may be used to enhance selection and 
reproduction policies. This may further the produc­
tion of top performers and ‘‘farmyard supermodels’’ 
(Harvey 2007, p. 15), but genome information may 
also be used to reduce phosphate excretion by 
tailoring food regimes to genomic profiles. As is 
indicated in Plato’s simile, the difference between 
human and non-human domesticated animals is that, 
whereas the fettered animals are merely the passive 
objects and targets of such technologies, human 
beings (released from their chains) may decide to use 
this type of information for performance enhance­
ment on their own accord, although, as Plato 
explains, an element of coercion is bound to be 
present in the early stages of this process. In this 
manner, genome illiteracy gives way to the embed­
ding of bioinformation in training and life-style 
regimes of top performers such as professional 
athletes. Thus, in the human context, in the context 
of top level sport it is imaginable that individuals 
themselves, in collaboration with coaches and health 
experts, will increasingly use personalised genomics 
information in order to develop optimal diets, career 
choices and other life-style decisions. Or, to use 
another example, the 21st century will not be a Brave 
New World where ‘super employees’ will be artificially 
produced by means of genetic modification. What is 
much more likely is that in the near future, various 
possibilities for pre-employment genetic screening 
(PEGS) will affect the course of professional careers 
in the sense that individuals themselves will tailor 
their diets and career decisions, as well as the 
design of their working environment, to personalised 
information concerning their relative strengths and 
weaknesses as reflected by their genomes (Holzman
2003).
Thus, top athletes may be regarded as a kind of 
avant-garde, as pioneers leading the way into the 
future of public health genomics, where more and 
more opportunities for using personalised genomics 
information, as well as for translating this informa­
tion into concrete life-style options for individuals, 
may present themselves. Thus, reflections on the 
ways in which the availability of genome information 
affects top sport is not only of interest for the athletes
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involved, but also for society at large, as certain uses 
of genomics information may spread from limited 
groups (top athletes, patients, risk groups, special 
professions) to the broader society of ‘‘ordinary’’ 
citizens (the research subject of an epidemiology of 
technology).
In 2007, Nature Genetics published a question of 
the year on its website, allowing experts from various 
backgrounds to explicitly consider possibilities for 
using personalised genomics information in the 
future. The discourse thus emerging could be 
regarded as an ‘‘ethical’’ laboratory, where future 
issues are explored by well-informed individuals in 
an interactive manner, responding to one another. 
Besides (and in combination with) academic desk 
analysis, the normal trade of philosophers and 
ethicists, and besides (and in combination with) 
literary explorations of genomics futures by profes­
sional novelists and science writers, such podiums 
provide an interesting source of complementary input 
for our effort to map the societal future of genomics.
On June 26 2000, Clinton, Collins and Venter 
presented the human genome sequence as a kind of 
map. Like the Lewis & Clark map, to which the 
human genome map was explicitly compared, it was 
a physical map, indicated rivers, mountains and 
various other physical elements as exactly as possible, 
providing the necessary input for a rather con­
sequential emerging practice: the colonisation of 
the American West. Today, the challenge will be to 
present a social-geographical map, indicating in 
various domains and regions how human genomics 
information is used, or bound to be used, and what 
infrastructures are emerging that may allow us to 
govern this process in such a manner that individuals 
may position themselves as the subjects, rather than 
as the objects, as the performers rather than the 
targets, of this consequential development.
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